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ABSTRACT
We consider the possibility of formally defining and classify-
ing critical pilot tasks. It seems clear that a task may be of
special importance either because there are serious consequences
if it is not carried out properly or because it places heavy
demands on the pilot in terms of workload, decisions, or control
activity . To include both the elements of danger and complexity
we propose to-define a critical pilot task as one that affords
a low probability of recovery from an incorrect pilot- decision or
control action.
At this point the difficulty of making a general classifica-
tion of tasks as more or less critical becomes obvious,-for the
probability of recovery from an error in any given task can be
v i.r \^li Y VL • V1^ V f L.i, k.111 V relL V	 A..iV Lb i^^ Vll^ 5^.:ctV ^.i l • \^A.l V V,i• 1. 
the same pilot in different aircraft. Individual pilots vary
widely in their levels of training, experience, emotional stability,
and technical understanding of the response dynamics of the air-
plane they are controlling. The level of effort that must be
expended to reduce the criticality of a certain task will depend
on the relative importance of the task in various types of aviation
activity: commercial airlines, air taxis, private pleasure flying,
aerial applications, and so forth.
We see three basic reasons for a task being critical.- A
task may have to be performed in a very narrow time window; it
may involve an operation near some limit of aircraft performance;
a it may involve an operation near some limit of pilot capability.
Each reason characterizes a class of critical tasks We identify
some of the more important tasks in each of these classes. We
also discuss the kinds of steps that may be taken to reduce the
i
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criticality of tasks in each of these three classes. Attempts
can be made to minimize'the , chances that the task will be
necessary, extend time limitations, provide additional infor-
mation to the pilot, relieve the pilot of the task, and so forth.
to a task being critical are
follow to improve matters are
view the most important of the
with the pilot's inherent
discuss the four elements of a
in  context: detecting that a
problem exists, identifying possible causes and their probabilities,
evaluating the effects of alternative responses, and choosing
one response. To these elements we relate some of the research
we have conducted for the Human Performance Branch in the past
five years -- research on attention, signal detection, decision
making, and reaction time.
iv
When the limitations leading
not so evident, the procedures to
not so easy to determine. In our
less-well-defined areas has to do
decision-making capabilities. We
critical decision in the aeronaut
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W
1.0 What is a critical pilot task?
There is a widespread, intuitive feeling among people inter-
ested in aviation safety that some pilot tasks and aircraft
operations can be classified as "critical." Most pilots have
stories to tell about close calls that they have experienced
and situations that they consider dangerous. Flight instructors
can identify certain maneuvers that their students must be able
to execute well in order to fly safely. Many air traffic con-
trollers have hair-raising stories of their own. Aviation-safety
experts can detail the circumstances that have led to aircraft
accidents.
In light of the rich variety of experience and opinion
available, the lack of formal attempts to define and classify
critical pilot tasks is surprising. Considerable study has been
invested in certain flight situations in which the risk of
accident is quite apparent or in which the pilot must make a
clearly crucial decision. One such situation is an impending
mid-air collision -- great effort has been expended in the search
for ways to prevent the close proximity of aircraft, and to
provide the pilot with warning devices and decision aids. As	 y
another example, there has been much discussion of the go/no-go
decision a pilot must make when breaking through a low ceiling
on an instrument approach. In this case, there are substantial
economic considerations involved in diverting an aircraft to
another airport, in addition to safety considerations.
{
We feel that there is great potential value attached to an
incisive definition of a critical pilot task. Such a definition, 	 wi
carefully ,Wade, could carry valuable implications. The worth of
this approach could be measured by the worth of the concepts that
1	 t,
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seem to follow from it: the identification of certain classes of
critical operations (which may be defined as critical for quite
different reasons), and, perhaps, ways of minimizing the features
of these operations that led to their being classed as critical.
In the following; pages, we propose a definition of a critical
task and consider the imtilications of this definition.
2.0 A proposed definition of a critical pilot task.
A definition of a critical pilot task must include the
elements of danger that result if' the task is not carried out
correctly, and also the demand upon the pilot in terms of work-
load, decisions, or control activity. It is apparent that there
are some tasks that may entail a high pilot workload, but which
may not be dangerous; on the other hand, there are tasks that may
require a• very simple decision from the pilot, but which carry a
very high cost if that decision is not correct. Therefore, instead
of predicating the definition solely on either the complexity or
the danger of the task, we propose the idea that
A critical pilot task is one that affords a low probabili ty
of recovery from an incorrect pilot decision or control
action. The lower the probability of recovery, the more
critical is the task.
3.0 Characteristics of
.,
 a critical task.
The proposed definition of a'critical task states that tasks
can be rated as more or less critical according to the probability
that the pilot will be able to recover from the; effects of an
incorrect decision or control action. So, in a sense, one cannot
speak of "critical" and "non-critical" tasks without identifying
2
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(at least implicitly) some point along a "continuum of criticality"
that separates the two categories. This identification may prove
very difficult because the probability of recovery from an error
in performing a certain task may be very different for different
pilots in the same aircraft or for the same pilot in different
aircraft. This is true because there are several different
reasons why the probability of recovery from an error may be low.
3.1 Reasons for a task being critical.
We suggest that there are three basic reasons why the prob-
ability of recovery from an'error may below. Each reason char-
acterizes a class of critical tasks.
(a) The nature of the task is such that there is a very narrow
time window in which the task must be performed. Therefore,
there may not be time for the pilot to second--guess his
original decision or control action. This would be the case
for an impending mid-air collision situation. To a lesser
degree, it would be true when a pilot must decide whether he
has adeauat'e runway visibility when breaking through a low
ceiling on final approach. In the latter case, the pilot
would at least have the option of making an early, conserva-
tive decision to go around and try again.
(b) The task involves operation near some critiaal limit of air-
craft performance. Within this class of operations we
include not only such well-defined limits as stall speeds,
never-exceed velocities, and load factors, but also such
task-dependent limits as aircraft courses and altitudes
which may brink; the aircraft near hazards to navigation.
Using this notion, we may speak of a class of critical tasks
that involve the operation of an aircraft sufficiently close
s
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to its limits that control errors (or even random disturb-
ances) may cause the limits to be exceeded. This class
would then include such diverse operations as flying through
severe turbulence (where the aircraft load factors may be
exceeded), making; a final approach in a gusty wind (where
airspeed may suddenly drop below stall speed), a noise-
abatement departure or short-field takeoff (both of which
involve airspeeds near the stall speed), flying through severe
icing conditions (where ice buildup on wings may raise the
stall speed), and making an instrument approach to a field
with hazardous obstructions near the approach path (where
a small deviation from the proper path could result in
hitting an obstruction).
(c) The task involves an operation near the performance capabil
itires of the pilot	 in o-eneral this class of critical taskS
involves a pilot workload (in terms of calculations, decisions,
and sensorimotor activities) that is sufficiently high that
he may not be able to respond properly if the necessity
for a new decision suddenly arises. A high pilot workload
of this nature could arise either as a result of the dynamic
characteristics of the aircraft -- if, for example, a
stability augmenter failed, or if the aircraft is inherently
sensitive to side gusts at slow airspeeds -- or as a result
of the complexity of the operation being performed, such as
flying a complicated traffic pattern on instruments ivrhile
receiving instructions from the approach controller. In
either case, the occurrence of a problem that in other
circumstances would prove trivial 'might result in a pilot
j
overload.	 x
I. I.
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3.2 Identifying; a critical task.
As mentioned above, the identification of a c,.-itical task is
complicated by the fact that the probability of recovery from an
incorrect decision or control response depends not only on the
nature of the operation being performed, but also on the charac-
teristics of the aircraft and the abilities and experience of the
pilot. Different types of aircraft, of course, can have widely
different operational limits; they can also vary greatly in their
propensity to be "forgiving" of control errors, unusual attitudes,
and rough piloting technique. Pilots, too, can have different
motor abilities and perceptual acuities. Presumably,, however,
medical examinations and pilot certification requirements serve
to eliminate from the pilot population those individuals who are
demonstrably deficient in these respects. Far greater differences
between pilots occur in their levels of training, experience,
rr+.^4- -f n r. n I n t r^ b -1 l 4-. s ♦ 	 n va .7 4- n	 v. { .^ l	 r7 n. r .. n .n .7 -!	 A the	 .n r.IL; 11IV LO WA ILa L 0 V ab .L ..L L V , Ql1 u VC'Vr^ I A, 1,. 1,".L arlULl p7 tCL %A _L V1 V11C re sp ons e
dynamics of the aircraft they are controlling.
In view of these factors, the identification of a well-
defined set of critical tasks for all pilots and all aircraft
may be impossible. Indeed, such an effort hardly seems worth-
while -- the identification of a situation from which recovery
is difficult has little but academic value if this situation very
rarely occurs. For example, a stall-spin incident by an airline
transport pilot in a commerical airliner clearly meets the criteria
of our definition of a critica- task, but such incidents do not
represent a significant part of the present aviation-safety
situation. Stall-spin incidents by student and private pilots
in light aircraft, on the other hand., do. We suggest, therefore,
'	 that different- levels of effort must be expended toward reducing_
the criticality of various tasks, and that these levels of effort
5
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should be different for different classes of aviation activity
(commercial airlines, air taxis, private pleasure-flying, aerial
applications, etc.).
a
However, we also suggest that there are some fundamental
concepts, common to many of the tasks we have mentioned as critical,
that one must be careful not to overlook. One of these concepts,
which, we feel, has not received adequate study, is that of the
basic decision-making capabilities of the pilot: his abilities to
estimate probabilities, to foresee the probable consequences of
alternative responses, to ,judge risks, to estimate accurately his
own sensorimotor capabilities, and then to choose the most appro-
priate response. We discuss the process of decision making in
Section 4. Two processes closely related to decision making,
namely attention and reaction time, are also discussed briefly
in Section 14.
3.3 Making a critical task less crit ical
In most cases, the very identification of a critical task
carries with it some indications of how the task can be made less
critical. If a task has been identified as critical because it
requires an operation near one of the time, aircraft, or pilot
limits discussed in Section 3.1, then the obvious thing to do is
to try to extend limits. For example:
(a) If a task requires a decision or control action within a
very short time period, then one of three approaches can
be employed. First, one can attempt to minimize the chances
that the task will become necessary. For the critical task
of collision avoidance, this approach would mean scheduling
and monitoring aircraft to reduce the probability that any
two aircraft would find themselves on a collision course.
•	 6
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For the critical task of judging whether runway visibility
is adequate when breaking through a low ceiling on final
approach, it might mean eliminating the need for the decision
by providing an automatic guidance system that could be
employed all the way to touchdown. Second, one can attempt
to extend the time period in which the decision can be made
and corrected. For the collision-avoidance task, this
approach might involve an early-warning system that would
allow the pilots to change course well before a collision
was imminent. For breakout-on--final, it would suggest either
a slower approach speed or some vision-enhancement technique
that would give the pilot better runway visibility. Third,
one can attempt to provide the pilot with additional infor-
mation that would increase the probability of his making a
correct decision. For collision avoidance, this approach
suggests an on-board computer that indicates to the pilot
an appropriate climb, dive, or turn to avoid the other air-
craft. For breakout--on-final, it suggests the use of automatic
runway-detection apparatus.
(b) If a task requires an operation near some limit of aircraft
performance, then one can attempt to extend this limit.
Obviously, aircraft with lower stall speeds, higher load
limits, more reliable instruments, better de-icing equipment,
and more forgiving dynamic response will be safer to fly.
Equally obviously, approach paths that avoid obstructing
terrain and hazards to navigation will be safer to use. 	 s
Because these facts are so apparent, the operational limita-
tions of existing aircraft have been care lly considered
during design and testing. It will be rare tiixt'an attempt
to extend them will prove fruitful. One exception might be
the installation of an angle of attack indicator in aircraft
7
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used in crop-dusting applications, where fairly violent
maneuvers must be carried out at very low altitude. This
would at least allow the pilot to know how close to the
critical angle of attack his aircraft is.
(c) If a task involves an operation near the performance capa-
bilities of the pilot, a variety of approaches can be tried.
First, one can attempt to relieve the pilot of the critical
task, either by minimizing; the chances of its occurrence or
by providing equipment to execute the task automatically.
Second s
 one can attempt to improve the capabilities of the
pilot through intensive training and experience in responding
to simulated emergencies. In some cases, this approach can
have dramatic results -- the Luftwaffe has recently achieved
a significant improvement in the safety record of their
F-104s by requiring theirpilots to flythem more hours per
month. Third, one can attempt to reduce the pilot's work-
load during the critical task so that he can pay more
attention to critical decisions that must be made. Fourth,
one can attempt to maximize the probability of a correct
	 I,
decision by providing the pilot with information-processing
aids and instruments that will help him decide and respond
correctly.
In summary, where the time, aircraft, and pilot limits that
result in a critical task are apparent, then the lines along which	 t
to attack the problem are also apparent. In the paragraphs above.,	 }
several of these definable limits have been discussed. Where
these limits are not well defined, the procedures to follow are
not nearly so evident. Perhaps the most important of these
nebulous areas is that of the pilot's inherent decision-making
capabilities.
8	 .
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4.0
	
The decision-making; capabilities of the pilot.
.t
At the risk of sounding metaphysical, we suggest that there
are some tasks that are'eritical, in part, because they do not t
seem to be critical.	 We also suggest that this type of critical
.i
task occurs more often than we can ever know -- after an aircraft
accident, we can never be sure whether the pilot may have failed
6
to notice, ignored, or rejected some clue to the impending problem
which, if acted upon correctly, might have allowed him to avoid
the accident.	 Upon reflection, any pilot can recall instances in
which something unusual or out-of-the-ordinary seemed to be
happening with an instrument or
	 	 , perhaps, with the aircraft's Y
response to a control movement.
	 Not being quite sure what was
going on, he may have waited a bit and found that the problem
seemed to go away.
	 Whether he realized it or not, he was making
a decision -- a decision to wait and see.
	 The fact that he is
a roun d to reflect on his de n-i-s ion indicateS that. his decisi-^n was
correct or, at least, that the problem was not really important.
The haunting thought is that there are many pilots who are not
around to second-guess an incorrect decision about a problem that
really turned out to be important. 	 It is because decisions are
being made almost continuously, whether obvious or not, that we
suggest that the decision-making characteristics of the pilotl
deserve greater attention than they have received.
4.1	 Elements of a critical pilot decision.
A critical pilot decision can be treated as consisting of
j.
four stages, each of which should be carried out correctly if a
correct decision is to be made:
(a)	 The pilot- must first detect that a problem exists that
requires a decision.
(b)	 Next, he must gather whatever data he can to identify the
9
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possible causes of the problem. He muss also estimate the
probability that each possible cause is, in fact, the actual
cause.
(c) Then, he must evaluate the effects of each alternative
response he can make. He must assign a value or cost to
each response for each possible cause.
(d) Finally, he must choose the response that best satisfies his
decision strategy, given his estimates of probable causes and
his estimates of the costs and values of various outcomes.
Each stage of this process requires different abilities of
the pilot and carries with it different problems.
4.2 Detection of a possible problem.
The process of detecting that a problem exists that requires
a decision is itself a process of decision making. it is now well
established that a sensory stimulus is not simply dichotomized as
3
present or absent by means of a Nixed threshold device in the i
peripheral sensory system. It is rather the case that the observer
sets a decision criterion at some point along a continuum of
sensory inputs more or less likely to represent signals in the
presence of noise, or alternatively stated, that he adjusts a
"response bias." The location of the criterion for the decision
"signal present," or the amount of bias in favor of that response,
is affected by the factors ,just described: the a priori probability
of signal occurrence, anc4 the values and costs of the various
possible decision outcomes. Statistical-decision theory requires
that all these factors be considered in an optimally-determined
decision process.
The value of realizing that the detection process is a
decision process is that statistical'-decision theory enables one
Report No. 1924
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'	 to separate sensory acuity from the non-sensory factors involved
in detection.	 By analyzing the relationship between correct-
detection responses and false-alarm responses, one can determine
whether an observed change in performance resulted from a change
in sensory acuity or from a change in the decision criterion or
response bias.	 Evidence shows that a relatively strong signal
will not be detected if the decision criterion is strict. 	 In a
technical report prepared under an earlier contract (NASw-676)
for NASA's Office of Advanced Research and Technology, Green and
Swets (Signal Detection Theory and Psychophysics, New York:
Wiley, 1966) presented the decision-making theory of signal de-
tection and reviewed the experimental results on visual and audi-
tory signals.	 Under a previous contract with the Human Performance
Branch of NASA-Ames, as described in BBN Report No. 1671, it was
shown experimentally that this theory applies as well to vibratory
signals.
Several other technical reports prepared under the last- 4
mentioned contract (NAS2-2676) dealt with other asnects of the
.detection process. 	 One, BBN Report No. 1440, presented extensive
data on the observer's decision process when he makes the decision,
alluded to earlier, to "wait and see." 	 In this case, the observer r
accumulates additional information over time to increase the
accuracy of his "signal/no-signal" decision, and must balance
the value of increased accuracy against the cost of letting time r
go by.	 Our studies showed that with proper training observers
can integrate the information in a series of observations; that
they behave in an optimal manner in balancing accuracy against
time; that they are more efficient when they can determine how
long to observe than when the observation period is fixed; and
that ,'the lengths of observations preceding signal and no- signal
decisions vary appropriately with changes in signal probability.
'	 Another study, described in BBN Report No. 1 1419, extended the
s
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theoretical concepts to treat temporal uncertainty about signal
occurrence; it was shown that the observer's detection performance
under temporal uncertainty can be predicted from his performance
when under no temporal uncertainty.
In the limit, signal detection with uncertain times of signal
occurrence becomes a process of vigilance. Basically, the pilot's
detection of a possible problem is a vigilance task. He must
continuously monitor his instruments and visual displays, as well
as his vestibular and other sensory inputs, in search of a signal
that might indicate something wrong. It has long been recognized
that the proportion of signals detected falls off significantly
in a vigilance task as.time proceeds. It is now recognized that
this drop in the detection, or "hit," probability is not simply
a result of observer fatigue or inattention, but is rather a
result of a change in his response criterion. His false-alarm
'►'\ %i I'\ Y\ /°4 Y Y` 'i / Y\ f\ l'iT A 	 1	 v\ M t	 Y N	 1.. H	 L... 	 l	 ^-Nom. vNvi. v..i.va4 u.t Ow^:7 G;J.ott^. dJi t,!t Ti!^e 11111 ^)r 0 )i]! t^.l..l)!1	 1.r'I -1 fTii^fji`IF+r	 ns	 r	 ,
indicate that his sensitivity stays substantially the same.
Apparently, as the observer gains experience in monitoring a
particular signal, he learns that the events for which he is
watching are rare. Therefore, a downward shift occurs in his a
priori expectation of signal presence, and he adopts a stricter
criterion for the decision "signal present." Swets and Kristofferson
have reviewed the literature on vigilance, and have outlined
additional research necessary, in a progress report submitted
under the present contract that is soon to appear in the Annual
Review of Psychology (Volume 21, 1970).
This phenomenon of criterion change may be of importance in
the early detection of possible danger signals by a pilot. On
the one hand, as a Pilo-t gains experience, he is better able to
,fudge what is an unusual instrument reading or an unusual air-
craft response to his control actions under various conditions.
12
Report No. 1924	 Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
On the other hand, he learns that the vast majority of these
unusual occurrences turn out to be of little consequence. There-
.fore, while the detectability of a certain event may increase, the
pilot's response criterion may change in such a way as to decrease
his hit rate. In order to ensure the earliest possible detection
of an incipient problem, ways might be explored to lead the pilot
to relax his decision criterion. Early-warning devices might be
employed to make a possible problem more apparent to the pilot.
Alternatively, attempts might be made to find ways to lower the ap-
parent cost to the pilot of a false-alarm response. These attempts
might involve the simulation of various failures during training
activities and the encouragement of early detection by the pilot.
The pilot needs not only to sustain his general attentiveness
through periods of vigilance, but also to time-share a selective
at-tent.-ion among 6evex 4al sources of Signals. In the Same report
mentioned above, Swets and Kristofferson have reviewed the
theoretical and experimental literature on selective attention.
Limitations on attention at any moment appear to be so severe
that most of the results are described in terms of the so-called
"single-channel" model. BBN Report No. 1675 to NASA-Ames describes
our application of this model to weak vibratory signals presented
to two fingers: the experiments showed that observers could not
attend simultaneously to these two input channels.
4.3 Identification of possiblecauses.
Having detected an unusual `occurrence, the pilot 'must estimate
the probability of each possible cause of the problem. _ His ability
to do this with accuracy will, of course, depend on his experience,
training, and technical understanding of the system he is controlling.
Report No. 1924 Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
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is expended in pilot training toward familiarizing the student
with the signs of an impending stall, with the characteristics
of the aircraft in various unusual attitudes, and with other
emergency conditions that he may never experience.
It is clear that training of this type is quite valuable.
Simulators can be used to confront the pilot with those situations
that cannot be produced safely in actual aircraft. It is like-
wise clear that this training should not end completely when the
pilot is licensed: a pilot suddenly confronted with a situation
which he has not experienced in some months or years may not,
recall quickly enough the things he was taught.
4.4 Evaluation of the effects of alternative responses.
Having identified the possible causes of the problem, the
pilot must consider the values and costs of each alternative
response he can make. Again, the ability of the pilot to
identify rapidly a set of responses appropriate to each possible
cause will depend on his experience and training. In some cases,
when the cause of the problem can be identified with virtual
certainty, there may be only one appropriate response to be made.
In other cases, an appropriate response to one possible cause may
be grossly inappropriate to another. In these cases, it is
imperative that the pilot consider the values and costs of all
potential responses.
The assessment of costs (or values) can be a decidedly non-
trivial process, since in many cases the pilot will be forced to
compare costs (or values) that have no common metric. Consider,
for example, the predicament of a pilot faced with a rapidly- t
falling fuel-level reading. Presume that he has good reason to	 z
I
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N
	 believe that in fact he has plenty of fuel, and that it is the
gauge that is in error. Nonetheless, the possibility exists that
fuel is leaking away and that grave danger may result if he does
not divert immediately ^o the nearest available airport. If he
does divert the flight, he and his passengers are likely to
experience a lengthy delay. In a case like this, the pilot must
attempt to balance the cost of the expected delay against the
possibility of catastrophe. The cost of a catastrophe is, in one
sense, infinite to the people involved. However, it is clearly
demonstrable that people do not treat the cost as infinite in
many situations: they are willing to accept a small probability
of death in order to avoid some other alternative that is almost
certain to be distasteful. Many accidents have resulted when
pilots have elected to try to stretch their fuel reserves or to
continue a flight even after they have been warned of adverse
weather conditions along their course.
Many of these accidents could be avoided if the pilots could
be convinced of the propriety of making more conservative decisions.
This problem can be attacked from two directions. First, pilots
can be educated to the fact that the likelihood of disaster in
certain situations is higher than they may have cared to admit
to themselves. Second, attempts may be made to lower the cost
of a conservative decision. For example, an airline might examine
its policies to see if it is overpenalizing_a pilot who terminated
a flight without reaching his destination when this termination
turns out not to have been necessary. The first approach is more
likely to prove successful with lower types of airman certificates,
who may through inexperience be mis-estimating probabilities.
The second approach is most likely to succeed with experienced
'	 pilots whose danger estimates are accurate, but who are likely
to take some risks if the cost of a conservative decision seems
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too high.
It has been suggested that the significantly higher accident
rate experienced by medical doctors in non-business flying; may be
explained with considerations similar to those just mentioned.
On the one hand, it is argued, doctors who have daily experience
with death may have developed some feeling; of immunity to disaster
-- they may not be willing to believe that it could happen to them.
On the other hand, their busy schedules may lead them to place.a
much higher cost on delays and postponements than other pilots
might. They may, for example, realize that if they don't get a
trip in this weekend, they may not have another chance for some
time. Both effects together may lead them to accept risks that
other pilots might not.
4.5 Choice of the best response.
Having estimated the costs of his various alternative {
responses, the pilot is still faced with choosing the response
to male. Which otie he chooses will depend upon his decision
strategy. He may choose the response that has the lowest expected
value of cost, given his estimate of the probabilities that various
causes are true. Or he may choose the response that minimizes the
maximum cost if it turns out not to be correct. He may employ
some other strategy that has some features of both strategies
just mentioned. There is no obvious reason why one particular	 i
strategy would be superior to all others.- It would, clearly, be
very interesting to determine in carefully-controlled simulator
experiments the types of strategies that pilots actually employ.
r
Regardless of the strategy that the pilot employs, he will be
forced to use it while under emotional and mental stress It is
r
.	
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well known that stress can significantly affect human decisions.
In some cases stress may cause an individual to fixate on a sin-
gle input channel or source of information. In other instances
stress leads to an inability to come to a decision. Lieblich
"Effects of Stress on Risk Taking," Psychonomic Science, 10,
303-4, 1968) has described an experiment in which subjects were
required to place bets while under the stress of electric shocks
applied at random intervals. A risk-taking metric was chosen by
which the subjects' betting strategies could be characterized.
A low--risk strategy involved placing bets with a small positive
expected value, but no chance of a large win. A high--risk strat-
egy involved placing bets with a negative expected value, but
with some chance of a very large win. It was found that the pre-
sence of stress led the subjects to assume a higher-risk strate-
gy. This was true whether or not they were led to believe that
they could avoid the shocks b y a.7 taring their strategies	 When
they did believe that the shocks were somehow connected with
their bets, however, they tended to vacillate far more in placing
their bets.
Vacillation by a pilot in making; a decision may greatly
reduce the chances of his making the proper decision in time
When the time lost in gathering further data decreases the prob-
ability of recovery more than the information gained increases it,	 f
the pilot should no longer defer his decision. In some instances
he must choose the response that is best according to available
data however inadequate he may feel those data to be. We suggest
that simulator studies of pilot behavior might also prove useful
in investigating his decision-making under stress. Where vacilla-
tion is found to be a problem, ways might be explored to force the
pilot to an early decision, to a shorter reaction time.`
17
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Several of our technical reports under the previous and current
contracts have dealt with aspects of reaction time. Two, BBN
Reports Nos. 1729 and 1921, describe an extension to reaction
time of the deferred-decision (or "wait-and-see") model developed
in the context of the decision making theory of signal detection
for sequences of discrete observation intervals. In our experiments,
the subject had to decide whether two successively-presented stim-
uli were the same or different; that is to say, he had to detect
a change, which is the type of decision a pilot makes continually.
The results are consistent with a model assuming that the subject
uses a "counter." for cumulating "dif''ference" information and a
"clock" for keeping time; that he sets both a count criterion and
a time criterion in accordance with - stimulus probabilities and
decision-outcome values and costs; that-his decision rule is to de-
cide "different" if the count criterion is exceeded before the time
criterion, otherwise to decide "same." Predictions were made for
the relationships among reaction times associated with correct and
incorrect "Same" and "different" decisions in a variety of experi-
mental conditions. The fact that an individual's subjective prob-
abilities and utilities affect his reaction time suggests that
analyses should be made of pilots' estimates of these quantities
in various situations, and that training will be desirable when
these estimates are inaccurate.
Three reports describe our work on the efficacy of associating
a warning signal with a signal that requires a response (or dan-
ger signal)	 BBN Report No. 1888 described the effects of a pre
a
ceding or following auditory stimulus on reaction times to a visual
t
stimulus. Both the occurrence of the tone and the possibility
of its occurrence were found to affect the reaction time to the
'	 light. The effect of the tone was facilitative, `he degree of
facilitation increasing up to a point with the duration of the
gone-light interval. Some facilitation apparently occurred even
18
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when the tone followed the light, providing the interval between
them was sufficiently brief. Report No. 1679 described various
effects of a warning signal on the reaction time to a signal
to respond. Reaction time was inversely related to the inter-
val between warning signal and signal to respond; when the inter-
val was constant its duration had no effect on reaction time; re-
action times were shorter with a constant interval of any dura-
tion than when the warning signal was omitted altogether. BBN
Report No. 1690 relates further experiments on the effectiveness
of warning signals. In these experiments the interval between
the warning signal and the signal to respond was variable, and
the warning signal was followed by a danger signal with probability
less tian 1.0. Observers were found to differ considerably in
the use made of the probabilistic warning information, and a
model was developed to describe the different response strategies
they used.
A recent experiment, described in BBN Report No. 1826,
examined reaction time to flashing visual indicators. A
.determination was made of the optimal flash rate and duty cycle
where the observer's task is to decide quickly whether the light
is flashing or steadily on. The signal was initiated at a
random point in its cycle to simulate conditions of low attention,
as might be caused by a heavy workload. As in our earlier
experiments, observers were found to adopt a time criterion,
or a predetermined waiting period -- in this case a criterion
appropriate to the expected flash rate and duty cycle.
i
